Can this decrepit facility, used to reprocess DOE-controlled highly radioactive spent fuel, be operated safety in case of a seismic event or other unusual event?
DNFSB letter & report of December 7, 2018 – linked here
Conclusion. In lieu of conclusive data regarding the actual conditions in the HCAEX Tunnel, engineering judgment is required to determine the input parameters for the non-linear fragility analysis. However, if the engineering judgment used to determine the input parameters for the non-linear fragility analysis is not sound, the usefulness of the non-linear fragility analysis results will be limited. At worst, this could lead to skewing the results of the analysis to an incorrect conclusion.
An inaccurate determination of whether the HCAEX Tunnel can meet or exceed its performance goal could result in the relaxation of necessary compensatory measures included in the H-Canyon JCO that provide a safety class safety function during and after a DBE. Therefore, the staff team concludes that the potential safety items described in this report regarding the input and assumptions related to concrete affected and unaffected by the HCAEX environment should be resolved prior to completion of the non-linear fragility analysis. Otherwise, the results of the non-linear fragility analysis and any decisions that it informs will be questionable.
photo: degraded concrete walls of H-Canyon radioactive gas exhaust tunnel