1. FISSILE MATERIAL MINIMIZATION THROUGH PACKAGING AND REMOVAL OF PLUTONIUM FUEL MATERIALS
https://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/SRNL-STI-2019-00316.pdf
While there may need to be some removal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in situations where the material is at risk of theft, we’re not so sure the removal of the “Fast Critical Assembly” (FCA) plutonium from Tokai-mura, Japan was fully warranted. As 236 kg of the 331 kg of plutonium removed was of UK origin, the question still begs why all the FCA plates were shipped to SRS and not to the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom. DOE still refuses to address that issue so we continue to wonder why this document washed out mention of the UK in it.
2. Considerations for the Maritime Transport of Category I Quantities of Fissile Materials
https://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/SRNL-STI-2019-00313.pdf
Packaging and ship security may be at appropriate levels but this document fails to address a huge weakness of sea shipment of weapon-usable material and spent fuel: that observers with patience, a good set of eyes and basic knowledge of land and sea transport can result in spotting of the transport ships. Witness that the entire FCA-removal opweration (see document above) from Japan in 2016 was spotted or the ships’ presence deducted in the UK, Japan and Charleston, South Carolina.
3. Packaging Options for Materials Processed Through the SRNL Mobile Plutonium Facility
https://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/SRNL-STI-2019-00353.pdf
– The documents were presented as part of talks at the PATRAM 2019 meeting in New Orleans from August 4 -9, 2019.