DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has released the “Performance Evaluation Report” (PER) for the work in Fiscal Year 2025 of the SRS plutonium Bomb Plant contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), and the performance of SRNS was POOR. This PER look like those that were issued as the plutonium fuel (MOX) project was falling apart a decade ago.
This sentence in the introduction says it all: “SRNS underperformed in project execution of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility
(SRPPF) project in FY 2025.” Thus, the project costs are certain to continue to go up and the schedule further delayed.
SRNS garnered but 40% of the potential award fee (bonus), an abysmal performance given that the award fees given by DOE to contractors are usually near 100%.
Something that raises red flags in the PER is that there is no indication given as to when the next cost estimate and near-completion of the pit plant (Critical Decsion-2/3) will be issued. NNSA had submitted documents in our successful complaint in federal court – that resulted in a Programmatic EIS being prepared (draft PEIS ste to be released i n May 2026) – that CD-2/3 would be issued in late 2025.
Will funding in Fiscal Year 2027 be at risk, as stated in he PER? We can only hope so and that the project is terminated before more billions of $ are needlessly wasted on the $35 billion pit plant (the most expensive building in U.S. history!), all in the name of making new nuclear warheads to fuel a new nuclear arms race.
National Nuclear Security Administration
Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC
Performance Evaluation Report
Contract No. DE-AC09-08SR22470
Contract No. DE-AC09-08SR22470
Savannah River Field Office
Evaluation Period:
October 1, 2024, through September 30,
2025
December 9, 2025
Evaluation Period:
October 1, 2024, through September 30,
2025
December 9, 2025
excerpts:
page 2
SRNS underperformed in project execution of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility
(SRPPF) project in FY 2025. Going into FY 2025, the plan was for SRNS to drive the project through
the transfer of project leadership to an experienced construction manager (CM), issue and start CD-3X
package construction scope, demonstrate funding execution via those CD-3X packages, and issue a CD
2/3 package supporting full cost/schedule approval. The project has seen a few benefits from the CM
transition, but they are minimal. The planned CD-3X packages pushed well past scheduled dates with
minimal work executed in FY 2025. The CD 2/3 submittal for the HFTOC package was successful, but
the overall project cost/schedule submittal pushed into FY 2026, negatively impacting NNSA efforts to
forecast FY 2026 funding needs while adding risk to FY 2027 funding. The SRPPF design failed to
meet 60 percent complete requirements when issued in October 2025, and the Design Gate 3 date was
pushed out by 8 months. Complete designs are required to feed construction scope in the field, and
these delays are limiting future work fronts into FY 2026.
(SRPPF) project in FY 2025. Going into FY 2025, the plan was for SRNS to drive the project through
the transfer of project leadership to an experienced construction manager (CM), issue and start CD-3X
package construction scope, demonstrate funding execution via those CD-3X packages, and issue a CD
2/3 package supporting full cost/schedule approval. The project has seen a few benefits from the CM
transition, but they are minimal. The planned CD-3X packages pushed well past scheduled dates with
minimal work executed in FY 2025. The CD 2/3 submittal for the HFTOC package was successful, but
the overall project cost/schedule submittal pushed into FY 2026, negatively impacting NNSA efforts to
forecast FY 2026 funding needs while adding risk to FY 2027 funding. The SRPPF design failed to
meet 60 percent complete requirements when issued in October 2025, and the Design Gate 3 date was
pushed out by 8 months. Complete designs are required to feed construction scope in the field, and
these delays are limiting future work fronts into FY 2026.
pages 13-14
SRNS supported the SRPPF project through effective interactions with external stakeholders [Tom: say what?!]
during project reviews, site visits, and tours. SRNS provided support through all phases of
preparation for these events including coordination of on-site logistics, management of requested
information, prompt and thorough responses to questions and lines of inquiry, preparation and13
participation in meetings, and tracking and completion of action items resulting from these
interactions. Specific examples include support, management and execution of the Technical
Independent Project Review (TIPR); multiple site visits and tours by key leaders and external
stakeholders.
during project reviews, site visits, and tours. SRNS provided support through all phases of
preparation for these events including coordination of on-site logistics, management of requested
information, prompt and thorough responses to questions and lines of inquiry, preparation and13
participation in meetings, and tracking and completion of action items resulting from these
interactions. Specific examples include support, management and execution of the Technical
Independent Project Review (TIPR); multiple site visits and tours by key leaders and external
stakeholders.
page 14
Issues
As of August 2025, SRNS has spent $1.07 billion but has only claimed an earned value of
$971M for that scope of work. Approximately half of the positive cost performance comes from
level-of-effort accounts like CM indirect and SRNS oversight. However, SRNS
is experiencing poor performance with discrete tasks such as Glovebox Fabrication/Design.
$971M for that scope of work. Approximately half of the positive cost performance comes from
level-of-effort accounts like CM indirect and SRNS oversight. However, SRNS
is experiencing poor performance with discrete tasks such as Glovebox Fabrication/Design.
Despite showing a positive cost variance for the fiscal year, CD-3C (Concrete Penetrations)
execution is projected by NNSA/SRNS to require an additional $250-300M to complete the
Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB)-approved scope. It was not until July
2025 that SRNS verbally notified NNSA that CD-3C will exceed the ESAAB-approved amount.
This overrun had been anticipated and communicated as a concern by NNSA for months, based
on the tracking of Task Order Awards (TOAs) awarded under the Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ) contract and related scope. To prevent such issues, SRNS should enhance its
oversight of CM-awarded contracts and provide timely information to NNSA to ensure proper
decision-making to set the project on a course for success.
execution is projected by NNSA/SRNS to require an additional $250-300M to complete the
Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB)-approved scope. It was not until July
2025 that SRNS verbally notified NNSA that CD-3C will exceed the ESAAB-approved amount.
This overrun had been anticipated and communicated as a concern by NNSA for months, based
on the tracking of Task Order Awards (TOAs) awarded under the Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ) contract and related scope. To prevent such issues, SRNS should enhance its
oversight of CM-awarded contracts and provide timely information to NNSA to ensure proper
decision-making to set the project on a course for success.
SRNS procurement was consistently slow in the first half of the year to meet data requests from
NNSA. NNSA has had to ask multiple times for subcontracts to support local reviews. These
delays however have been reduced over the last few months.
NNSA. NNSA has had to ask multiple times for subcontracts to support local reviews. These
delays however have been reduced over the last few months.
page 15
Issues:
SRNS finish adherence to the forecast and baseline schedules for self-performed scope in FY
2025 was well below the desired level of 95 percent adherence based on the DOE Project
Assessment and Reporting System excerpt. For FY 2025, only 47 percent of activities were
completed as forecasted, and only 17 percent were completed as baselined.
SRNS finish adherence to the forecast and baseline schedules for self-performed scope in FY
2025 was well below the desired level of 95 percent adherence based on the DOE Project
Assessment and Reporting System excerpt. For FY 2025, only 47 percent of activities were
completed as forecasted, and only 17 percent were completed as baselined.
SRNS project reporting has not provided adequate context of overall project status. Reporting
lists accomplishments and some discrete issues/challenges, but the reports give no sense of the
magnitudes of schedule delays and cost overruns that have been experienced during the
performance period. The lack of recognition and acknowledgement of issues results in a
corresponding lack of communication of recovery plans.
lists accomplishments and some discrete issues/challenges, but the reports give no sense of the
magnitudes of schedule delays and cost overruns that have been experienced during the
performance period. The lack of recognition and acknowledgement of issues results in a
corresponding lack of communication of recovery plans.
In finalizing the design for the Y810 project, SRNS failed to effectively manage the interfaces
among the organizations. When NNSA directed descoping of Y810 from SRNS (NNSA-SRPPF-
24-0200), the direction stated “Your support of this acquisition strategy revision as the SRPPF
project Design Authority (DA) and SRNS Site M&O contractor remains critical to the success of
the SRPPF project. Your continued support is required.” Further, the FY’25 Award Fee Plan,
under Subjective Fee Area 2, states “The Contractor shall support the NNSA by working with the
United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) to deliver all infrastructure and logistical
services required for successful USACE execution…”. However, as documented in NNSA-
SRPPF-25-0173, SRNS was unresponsive in supporting the resolution of identified interface
issues between the USACE and Fluor designs from June through August, hampering successful
USACE execution of the project.
among the organizations. When NNSA directed descoping of Y810 from SRNS (NNSA-SRPPF-
24-0200), the direction stated “Your support of this acquisition strategy revision as the SRPPF
project Design Authority (DA) and SRNS Site M&O contractor remains critical to the success of
the SRPPF project. Your continued support is required.” Further, the FY’25 Award Fee Plan,
under Subjective Fee Area 2, states “The Contractor shall support the NNSA by working with the
United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) to deliver all infrastructure and logistical
services required for successful USACE execution…”. However, as documented in NNSA-
SRPPF-25-0173, SRNS was unresponsive in supporting the resolution of identified interface
issues between the USACE and Fluor designs from June through August, hampering successful
USACE execution of the project.
page 17
Issues:
The Y799 Main Process Building (MPB) Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) submitted on May
29, 2025, was determined by the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) team to be of insufficient
quality to continue the ICE process. The inability of SRNS to develop a quality baseline
submittal has negatively impacted NNSA’s ability to appropriately plan and fund the project.
This issue has resulted in reductions in project funding that will further delay project completion.
The Y799 Main Process Building (MPB) Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) submitted on May
29, 2025, was determined by the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) team to be of insufficient
quality to continue the ICE process. The inability of SRNS to develop a quality baseline
submittal has negatively impacted NNSA’s ability to appropriately plan and fund the project.
This issue has resulted in reductions in project funding that will further delay project completion.
The 3X package early submittals have continued to slip throughout FY 2025. This reduces the
benefit of having CD-3X package scopes to accelerate field work on critical path scope, or aid in
leveling the amount of onsite personnel at peak execution. The dates below demonstrate the slip
in CD-3X package submittals to initiate the process of approval throughout FY 2025. The
commitment dates are based on the agreement reached between SRNS and NNSA in letter
SRNS-F2000-2024-00049. The revised commitment dates are from the latest commitment from
SRNS to NNSA in letter SRNS-F2000-2025-00205.
benefit of having CD-3X package scopes to accelerate field work on critical path scope, or aid in
leveling the amount of onsite personnel at peak execution. The dates below demonstrate the slip
in CD-3X package submittals to initiate the process of approval throughout FY 2025. The
commitment dates are based on the agreement reached between SRNS and NNSA in letter
SRNS-F2000-2024-00049. The revised commitment dates are from the latest commitment from
SRNS to NNSA in letter SRNS-F2000-2025-00205.
Incentive fee available $32,058,582
Incentive fee awarded $12,829,529
Photo of SRS Plutonium Bomb plant when it was the MOX plant, by High Flyer; Pit plant sign – photo by DOE