DOE-SR Agency Update to Savannah River Site Citizens Advisory Board – Stunning Revelation about HB-Line Personnel Failures while Producing Unneeded Plutonium Oxide for Failed MOX Project
4 employees terminated, newly trained staff may increase risks if HB-Line operates
Terry Spears, DOE-SR Deputy Manager, used the information below to provide the DOE-SR Update on Tuesday, November 17, 2015.
STATUS OF SRNS OPERATIONS PAUSE
“All facilities under SRNS management have entered deliberate operations with exception of HB-Line. HB-Line may enter deliberate operations by the end of November. DOE-SR continues to assess SRNS activities.
The root cause analysis and associated corrective actions for the HB-Line Technical Surveillance Requirement (TSR) violation is complete and was presented to the SRNS Senior Management Review Board.
The root cause analysis found:
o Willful procedure violation by the work team.
o Unwillingness of the work team to call a Time Out.
o Significant departure from observed Conduct of Operations.
o Less than adequate First Line Manager performance.
o Less than adequate management engagement.
In addition, eleven “Other Causes” were identified and six Opportunities for Improvement. SRNS briefed DOE-SR concerning the report on November 5, 2015.
No facilities or organizations have completed actions required to exit deliberate operations and DOE-SR will review sustainability plans and assessment completed to supports the decision for exiting deliberate operations.
The SRNS Sustainment Plan is complete and will be revised as necessary as new information is learned. Sustainment plan actions include a half-day pause by each organization monthly for six months; an externally-led assessment of nuclear operations focusing on nuclear safety culture; quantifiable improvements in the training and qualifications program; and improvement to the Contractor Assurance System under the supervision of the SRNS Senior Management Review Board (SMRB). Long-term actions necessary to sustain improvement include requirements for periodic self-assessments, Internal Evaluation Board assessments, operational pause periods and routine periodic involvement of the Operational Excellence organization and the SMRB.”
Question: What should the HB-Line be allowed to be out back into operation with newly trained personnel to produce a plutonium product that simply isn’t needed? Such a situation poses operational and safety problems that could set things up for an accident.
—-
Savannah River National Lab Report, “Investigation of In-Line Monitoring Options at H Canyon/HB Line for Plutonium Oxide Production,” released November 2015 – linked here
“In 2011, the H Canyon and HB Line facilities were chosen to begin dissolving and purifying excess plutonium oxide for initial feedstock material for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. The goal for production is to provide 1 metric ton (MT) per year of MOX feedstock by FY17. Meeting this goal will be challenging unless measures are taken to reduce waste and/or increase throughput. In-line process monitoring could provide the needed tools to help meet H Canyon/HB Line production goals.”
An unneeded “challenge” that will be difficult to meet… As 9.6 kgs were produced in 15 months, they only have to increase production by about 993 kgs per year to meet the 1 MT per year goal…