The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an independent agency which provides much-needed oversight of DOE facilities, has issued a critical assessment of actions DOE is taking at the Savannah River Site to make its tritium-processing operations safer.
The assessment of the DNFSB raises concern if DOE is doing enough to prevent and mitigate accidents with tritium processing at SRS.
The DNFSB’s report, attached to a letter dated June 24, 2020, entitled “Staff Evaluation of NNSA’s Proposed and Ongoing Actions for Improving Safety at the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities,” is critical of steps DOE has taken so far.
The “summary” of the report states: “The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) rejected Recommendation 2019-2, Safety of the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities [1], based on the statement that it is already addressing the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board or DNFSB) concerns with proposed and ongoing actions [2 – 4]. This report summarizes the current status of those actions and the staff’s assessment of the effectiveness of those actions in addressing the issues of adequate protection identified in the Board’s Recommendation.”
“The Savannah River Site’s (SRS) Tritium Facilities’ new documented safety analysis (DSA) approved in December 2019 [5] contains improvements that address some of the previous Board concerns from 2011 [6, 7], but calculated dose consequences for co-located workers are still unacceptably high (based on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) own requirements); calculated dose consequences for the public challenge the evaluation guideline; and no new controls have been identified and implemented that reduce the calculated dose consequences to DOE’s acceptable levels. SRS has not tested safety management programs that could help mitigate accident consequences, such as its emergency preparedness and response program, to demonstrate their effectiveness. Finally, SRS has not implemented any compensatory measures to ensure safety in the interim.”
“Conclusion. The SRS Tritium Facilities’ new DSA approved in December 2019 [5] contains improvements that address some of the previous Board concerns from 2011 [6, 7]. It does not address the core concerns expressed by the Board in 2011 or those expressed in Recommendation 2019-2. Calculated dose consequences for co-located workers are still unacceptably high (based on DOE’s own requirements); calculated dose consequences for the public challenge the evaluation guideline; and no new controls have been identified and implemented that reduce the dose consequences to DOE’s acceptable levels. Furthermore, safety management programs that could help mitigate accident consequences, such as the site’s emergency preparedness and response program, have not been tested to demonstrate their effectiveness. Finally, SRS has neither implemented any compensatory measures to ensure safety in the interim, nor has any it developed any plans to implement such measures.
All of the items NNSA cited as addressing the Board’s concerns were known and taken into account in the development of Recommendation 2019-2. The Board’s staff’s evaluation of the rejection letters [2, 3] and the information NNSA officials provided in the Board’s October 28, 2019, public meeting [4] have only confirmed that understanding. The Board’s staff and NNSA differ significantly on the perception of the risk to workers and the public associated with the SRS Tritium Facilities. In the staff’s assessment, NNSA’s proposed and ongoing plans will not result in sufficient improvement to the safety posture of the Tritium Facilities.
The Board’s staff will continue evaluating NNSA’s progress towards completing its proposed and ongoing actions, and will provide periodic updates to the Board.”
DNFSB document is posted here: